Why States Rebel

functional equivalent to interstate alliances 56 3.3.1 What terrorist groups need support for 56 3.3.1.1 Hosting 58 3.3.1.2 Military support 58 3.3.1.3 Financial support 59 3.3.1.4 Endorsement 59 3.3.2 A bird in a gilded cage: The alliance security dilemma from a terrorist perspective 61 3.3.2.1 Costs of sponsorship for the supported group 61 3.3.2.2 When terrorists fall prey to international politics 62 3.3.3 State sponsorship and the security dilemma 63 3.3.3.1 Benefits of sponsorship 63 3.3.3.2 Costs of sponsorship 65 3.4 When do states decide to sponsor? 69 3.5 Sponsorship and the alliance dilemma 71 3.5.1 Abandonment risks in sponsorship relations 72 3.5.2 Entrapment risks in sponsorship relations 72 3.6 Sponsorship and the domestic alliance dilemma 74 4 Research design: Assessing state sponsorship of terrorism 77 4.1 Independent variable: Systemic incentives for alliance behavior 77 4.2 Conditional variable: Domestic politics 80 4.3 Dependent variable: Sponsorship commitment 82 4.3.1 Hosting 83 4.3.2 Military support 84 4.3.3 Financial assistance 85 4.3.4 Endorsement 85 4.4 The case of Syria 88 5 From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah 93 5.1 Nature of the Sponsorship Dilemma 94 5.1.1 Drifting apart: The power imbalance between Syria and Israel 94 5.1.2 Bridging the gap? Fatah/PLO's capacity as an ally 96 5.1.2.1 Attacks against Israel 97 5.1.2.2 Support base 98 5.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 99 5.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 100 5.1.3 Severity of conflict 102 5.1.4 Availability of alternative allies 104 5.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 106 5.1.6 Conclusion 108 5.2 Domestic politics: The Struggle for Syria 110 5.2.1 Ties that divide: Ba'thist factionalism and the struggle for Syria 1963-1970 112 5.2.2 One to rule them all: Asad's consolidation of power 1970-1976 118 5.2.3 Conclusion 122 5.3 Syria's policy towards Fatah (1964-1976) 124 5.3.1 Hosting 124 5.3.2 Military support 127 5.3.3 Financial support 131 5.3.4 Endorsement 132 5.3.5 Conclusion 136 6 The outstayed welcome: Syria & the Kurdistan Workers' Party 139 6.1 Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 140 6.1.1 A clear superiority: The power imbalance between Turkey and Syria 140 6.1.2 Added value: The PKK's capacity as an ally 143 6.1.2.1 Attacks against Turkey 143 6.1.2.2 Support base 146 6.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 148 6.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 150 6.1.3 Severity of conflict 152 6.1.4 Availability of allies 155 6.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 157 6.1.6 Conclusion 160 6.2 Domestic politics: Power consolidation and a looming succession crisis 162 6.2.1 To Hama and back again (1976-1985) 164 6.2.2 Constraining praetorianism: A family affair 170 6.2.3 Conclusion 172 6.3 Syria's policy towards the PKK (1978-1998) 175 6.3.1 Hosting 175 6.3.2 Military support 179 6.3.3 Financial support 180 6.3.4 Endorsement 181 6.3.5 Conclusion 184 7 A shifting balance: Syria & Hizballah 187 7.1 Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 188 7.1.1 Facing a decisive edge: the power imbalance between Syria and Israel 188 7.1.2 Hizballah's capacity as an ally against Israel 191 7.1.2.1 Attacks against Israel 191 7.1.2.2 Support base 194 7.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 195 7.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 197 7.1.3 Severity of conflict 199 7.1.4 Availability of allies 202 7.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 205 7.1.6 Conclusion 209 7.2 Domestic politics: Power transition and external shocks 211 7.2.1 The heir apparent 213 7.2.2 Seasons in Damascus 215 7.2.3 The emergence of the triumvirate 218 7.2.4 Conclusion 220 7.3 Syria's policy towards Hizbollah (1989-2006) 222 7.3.1 Hosting 222 7.3.2 Military support 225 7.3.3 Financial support 228 7.3.4 Endorsement 229 7.3.5 Conclusion 233 8 Findings and implications 239 8.1 Formation of sponsorship 240 8.2 Patterns of sponsorship 243 8.3 Theoretical implications 248 8.4 Avenues for further research 250 8.5 Policy implications 252 9 References 255